We bridge current streams of innovation research to explore the interplay between R&D, external knowledge, and organizational structure-three elements of a firm's innovation strategy which we argue should logically be studied together. Using within-firm patent assignment patterns, we develop a novel measure of structure for a large sample of American firms. We find that centralized firms invest more in research and patent more per R&D dollar than decentralized firms. Both types access technology via mergers and acquisitions, but their acquisitions differ in terms of frequency, size, and integration. Consistent with our framework, their sources of value creation differ: while centralized firms derive more value from internal R&D, decentralized firms rely more on external knowledge. We discuss how these findings should stimulate more integrative work on theories of innovation. 
has isolated a set of important dyadic relationships in an e¤ort to understand these interrelated questions. For example, a substantial body of work has advanced our understanding of the relationship between internal R&D and external knowledge, (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Pisano, 1990; Katz and Allen, 1982) . More recently, a small literature on the structure of R&D has explored how the resource allocation decision is related to the centralization or decentralization of R&D (e.g. Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Lerner and Wulf, 2007) . Separately, work on structural integration and resource recon…guration has looked at how organizations are shaped by acquisitions and absorption (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006; Karim and Mitchell, 2000) . Surprisingly, there remains little integration of the aforementioned streams. This lack of synthesis may be due to data constrains, since most work that considers such organizational dynamics tends to rely on small samples (Karim and Mitchell, 2004, and Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 are notable exceptions). Understandably, researchers must often cede the pursuit of a richer understanding of strategic interrelationships in exchange for "analytical precision and theoretical rigor" (Zollo and Singh, 2004) . Nonetheless, this lacuna is an important and understudied limitation, since the very word "organization"-from the Greek organon ("tool, instrument, set of rules")-denotes a coherent system or unit where interdependent parts work as one. In fact, a central tenet of organization theory holds that the structures, systems, and processes of a …rm should be interdependent and must be mutually supportive and coherent (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Nadler and Tushman, 1997; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow, 2011) .
It is the pursuit of this coherence logic that motivates our paper. Using a novel largescale dataset, we explore whether …rms demonstrate distinct and coherent combinations of R&D organizational structure and knowledge-sourcing strategies, as would be expected given the concatenated predictions of these emerging theories of innovation. We propose that …rms pursuing a particular approach to innovation (e.g., a strong focus on internal research like IBM or an "acquire and develop" approach like Cisco) also need a well-matched supporting organizational structure (e.g., centralized or decentralized). Empirically, we exploit a sample that includes nearly all patenting public American …rms, and develop a new measure of R&D organizational structure which uses the ratio of patents assigned to a¢ liates versus corporate parents as a proxy for the decentralization of R&D. This involves matching 576,052 patents to 1,014 publicly traded American corporations and their 2,768 a¢ liates. By documenting the types of choices that …rms make, we bridge streams of the literature that have previously studied dyadic relationships between internal and external knowledge sourcing, between organizational structure and innovation, and between acquisitions and structure.
Our …ndings extend and clarify prior results. We …nd evidence that strongly supports the coherence logic. Knowledge sourcing strategies appear to be systematically related to organizational structure. Moreover, the market valuation of these knowledge sourcing strategies strongly correlates with structure. We …nd con…rmatory large-scale evidence that researchoriented …rms are signi…cantly more centralized than others, consistent with earlier small-sample …ndings (Hoskisson, et al. 1993; Kay, 1988; Argyres and Silverman, 2004 ). But we also …nd that organizational structure seems to strongly condition the relationship between …rms' research focus and their external knowledge acquisition strategy. Though both centralized and decentralized …rms acquire external technology, centralized …rms do so less frequently and tend to make smaller acquisitions. Moreover, they manage acquisitions di¤erently. Acquisitions by centralized …rms frequently undergo full structural integration (Puranam et al., 2006) , whereas decentralized …rms tend to keep acquisitions as discrete entities.
Importantly, the logic underlying these patterns of choice is re ‡ected in measurable di¤er-ences in the composition of …rms'market value. Whereas centralized …rms draw most of their intangible value from internal R&D stocks, decentralized …rms derive relatively more value from externally acquired patents. This …nding is especially strong for large …rms and …rms with higher technological diversity.
Our results imply that a successful innovation strategy requires careful alignment both between internal and external knowledge sourcing, and between the internal/external mix of inputs and organizational structure. The implied coherence, however, does not necessarily imply a particular causal structure. Establishing causality is important, but given the nature of our data, it is beyond the scope of our project. Furthermore, it is just as important to develop a fuller theory of innovation that accounts for the dynamics we highlight in this study. By developing a new empirical measure and systematically exposing the relationships between internal research, external knowledge, and organizational structure among a nearly comprehensive set of …rms, we take an important step towards the development of such theory.
Three Pillars of Innovation Strategy
We draw upon important streams in the innovation literature that have explored dyadic relationships between research, external knowledge and structure. The …rst explores how the nature of research inside a …rm is related to how the activity itself is organized. Firms that invest heavily in basic research have been shown to have more centralized R&D, whereas decentralized R&D, managed by business units and divisions, tends to be more applied and incremental (Argyres and Silverman, 2004) . This association is theorized to be driven by a …t between function and structure, as research is often managed through a centralized organization to exploit economies of scale and scope. By contrast, development is often managed in business units, closer to where it will be applied (Kay, 1988) , arguably because often business unit managers are more likely to favor investments that are closely tied to existing products than large research projects with uncertain payo¤s (Hoskisson et al., 1993; Lerner and Wulf, 2007) . In sum, we would expect …rms that conduct basic research to typically centralize R&D, whereas decentralized …rms are less likely to invest in basic research.
Our data allows us to explore whether this relationship, which had previously been shown in small sample studies, also holds in our comprehensive sample. But missing from this literature is an in-depth treatment of the logical consequences that such patterns would imply:
If decentralized …rms are less likely to conduct basic research themselves, are they also more reliant upon external technology for growth? If so, do decentralized …rms approach acquisitions di¤erently? And how much of this di¤erence is the result of organizational structure, and how much the result of di¤erences in the type of R&D they perform? Though Argyres and Silverman (2004) hint at this issue by exploring how structure conditions a …rm's propensity to "build on. . . innovations developed outside," they conceptualize external search in terms of how much the …rm cites external patents, but ignore acquisition of external knowledge via mechanisms that can have feedback e¤ects on structure, like M&A.
Thus, to probe these questions further, we look to the second literature, which explores how and why …rms access external knowledge. Internal research helps …rms identify, evaluate, and assimilate external knowledge (Rosenberg, 1979; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) , which often comes via acquisitions (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Fleming, 2001) . But while many have interpreted absorptive capacity to imply that internal research should lead to a more e¢ cient acquisition of external knowledge (Arora and Gambardella, 1994) , others have argued that investments in internal research may actually bias …rms against external knowledge (Katz and Allen, 1982) , and that acquisitions may reduce resources and incentives for internal research (Hitt, et al., 1990) .
Bridging these streams suggests a complex interplay between internal research, external knowledge, and structure. Here it is useful to consider the insights from a third literature, which has focused on the dynamics of resource recombination. Insofar as decentralization is associated with a modular organizational structure (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Karim, 2006) , decentralized …rms might …nd it easier to deal with larger acquisitions. This is because the target can be left to manage itself for the most part, much as other business units are managed. Whether and when the acquired …rm is integrated or recombined would depend on the potential synergies with existing units (Karim and Mitchell, 2004) , and will likely a¤ect the future autonomy and performance of the target (Puranam, et al., 2006) . By contrast, centralized …rms will likely have to rapidly integrate a target or allow it to function autonomously. In other words, acquisitions of R&D-intensive targets can push the …rm toward decentralization unless the acquisition is rapidly integrated, which is costly.
For example, Microsoft has a centralized R&D structure and spent $9 billion on R&D in 2011.
Much of this has been in basic research, employing 850 PhDs and leading to key innovations such as Xbox, tablet PC technology, font-resolution technology, and data-mining capabilities.
Microsoft has often acquired and built upon external technology, such as Spyglass (the basis for Internet Explorer). Nonetheless, Microsoft has struggled with large acquisitions, such as aQuantive, an online advertising technology …rm bought in 2006. Press accounts suggest that a key problem was the di¢ culty in integrating part of this acquisition into the Online Business Service division. Other parts of aQuantive were ultimately spun o¤, but the overall deal failed and was reported as a $6.2 billion write-o¤ in 2012. In contrast, the more recent acquisition of Skype was handled di¤erently. Skype was left to operate as a standalone subsidiary, e¤ectively moving Microsoft toward a more decentralized structure. This anecdote suggests that even Microsoft's vast technical absorptive capacity was not enough to overcome structural misalignment, and it is the sort of puzzle that motivates us to take this …rst step at disentangling the role of structure from the role of internal research capabilities in relation to the acquisition of external knowledge.
Clearly, many contingencies may in ‡uence the direction in which a …rm's strategy and structure develop (Galbraith, 1977) . However, a …rm will perform well (and survive) if organizational structure, internal research, and knowledge acquisition are aligned to support each other-if they are coherent (Siggelkow, 2011; Teece, et al., 1994; Nadler and Tushman, 1997) . Indeed, as a number of notable …rm histories have shown, though structure and strategy are not permanent, they seem to coevolve along complementary paths. For instance, DuPont, which relied upon external technologies such as cellophane and rayon before World War I, turned to internal research in the 1930s to generate nylon and acrylics. Along with this shift, it also centralized its R&D (Hounshell and Smith, 1988) . But more recently, DuPont has adopted a more decentralized structure, with a number of research-intensive businesses operating as standalone subsidiaries.
Tellingly, most of these subsidiaries have come via large acquisitions, such as Pioneer Hi-Bred (a $10 Billion seed and agro-chem …rm) and Danisco (a $6Bn Danish food ingredients producer).
In e¤ect, the new strategy has reinforced the …rm's evolution toward decentralization, treating acquisitions as new businesses which bring growth, rather than "key ingredients" to fuel growth via internal recombination (Karim and Williams, 2012; Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell, 1998) .
The evolution of Du Pont, from exploiting external innovations to relying upon internal research to returning to acquisitions is instructive. The changes were sometimes driven by changes in organizational structure, and in other cases, organizational structure adapted to the change (Hounshell and Smith, 1988) . What is important for our discussion is that, regardless of the direction of causality, organizational structure and knowledge sourcing seemed to remain coherent. We do not contend that one or the other innovation strategy is better. Rather, these should depend upon the environment and the particularities of the …rm itself. As Karim and Mitchell (2004) We identify the patents held by …rms by selecting all patents granted by the USPTO between 1975 and 2007 and assigned to publicly traded US …rms or their wholly owned subsidiaries (called a¢ liates from now on). We match …rms to patents by matching assignee names and addresses.
The matching is based on comparing the assignee name and address as it appears on the patent document to the name and address of companies in BvD's Icarus database.
At the core of our measure is the fact that patents are often assigned to wholly owned a¢ liates of a parent …rm. Because we can identify a¢ liate-parent relationships from the BvD database, we can distinguish between "centralized" patents assigned to the parent and "decentralized" patents assigned to a¢ liates. We match a total of 576,052 patents to 1,014 Compustat …rms (the "parent" or "headquarter" …rms), which themselves own 2,768 a¢ liates. Of these, 100,951 (or 17.5%) of our sample patents are decentralized by our measure. To illustrate, Johnson and Johnson (a highly decentralized …rm) itself holds only a small fraction of its patents in its own name. The rest are assigned to dozens of wholly owned a¢ liates.
Ownership data consists of two parts: cross-sectional ownership information from Icarus for 2008, and M&A data from SDC Platinum and Zephyr. The cross-sectional data shows active a¢ liates as of 2008, while the M&A data helps us reconstruct ownership links to a¢ liates that have dissolved. We exploit the substantial variation in post-merger structural integration (we use the term "absorption" for brevity) to shed light on di¤erent acquisition strategies. This is also the basis for a key variable in our analysis, namely the patents owned by a …rm that come through an acquisition.
To determine whether an acquired …rm is absorbed or kept as an a¢ liate, we identify all …rms that have patents but are no longer active. We then match these …rms to the SDC M&A database to see whether any of these …rms have been directly acquired by a sample …rm or by one of the a¢ liates of a sample …rm. For example, we identify 121 patents assigned to WebTV Networks, a …rm that did not exist as a separate company in 2008. By matching to SDC, we can see that WebTV was purchased in 1997 by Microsoft, then dissolved and absorbed into Microsoft's MSN Networks. This measurement approach works because the original assignee is recorded at the time of the patent grant, allowing us to identify patents by …rms (like WebTV) even when the original assignee is dissolved.
Patent Assignment as a Proxy for Decentralization
A major empirical contribution of our paper is the development of a new patent-based measure of decentralization. A virtue of our measure is that it relies on published data and is readily replicable and scalable. Whereas a …rm's research focus and external knowledge-sourcing activities can be tracked using patents, R&D spending or alliances (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996) , the internal organization of R&D is extremely di¢ cult to observe. This fundamentally "within the black box" …rm characteristic is by far the most understudied of the three dimensions we discuss here.
Notable studies in this domain have utilized small samples (Lerner and Wulf, 2007) often acknowledging this limitation and the need for "future empirical research [to] examine the key relationships in larger samples and across longer time periods" (Argyres and Silverman, 2004) .
As our new measure does precisely this, it promises to open a new window into the internal organization of …rms'R&D function.
We classify individual patents as centralized or decentralized based on whether they are assigned to the parent …rm or to the a¢ liate. Aggregating up to the parent …rm level provides share patents assigned, our measure of how centralized or decentralized a …rm's patent portfolio is. We also use a discrete version of this measure which classi…es a …rm as decentralized, hybrid, or decentralized based on the tertile of share patents assigned to which it belongs. For ease of exposition we use "centralized …rms" rather than "…rms with centralized R&D organizational structure," since focus is on how research is organized, although we suspect our …ndings extend to …rm structure more broadly. Patent assignment as a measure of decentralization has three important advantages: it is based on observed behavior, it is useful for large samples, and it is replicable.
Patent assignments here have no ownership implications because our American headquarters fully own their a¢ liates and thus maintain ultimate rights, regardless of who manages the patents. However, we interpret patent assignment as a proxy for the delegation of authority or autonomy over R&D management. Assignment may reinforce the identi…cation and long-term ties between a manager and the intellectual property under her charge, so that opportunistic behavior becomes costly in terms of reputation (Baker, et al., 2002) , or it may increase division worker's intrinsic sense of autonomy (Puranam et al., 2006) . Similarly, assignment of patent rights may be associated with a credible delegation of informal authority, since assignment allows the a¢ liate to directly contract with outside licensees, without formally requiring headquarters to "sign o¤" on deals. More simply, assignment may re ‡ect a broader "hands o¤" orientation.
We are agnostic as to which mechanism might be at play, since all evidence points to assignment as associated with increase autonomy. Conversely, it is di¢ cult to argue that such assignments would in any way reduce a division's autonomy. Nonetheless, assignment of patents to a¢ liates may be su¢ cient -but not necessary for decentralization, because a business or division inside a …rm may have de facto authority over its R&D and innovation, but still not have any patents assigned to it. As with any proxy measure that lends itself to large-scale empirical analysis, our measure is practical but imperfect, and we admit that there are trade-o¤s to consider. In our case, there may be sources of unobserved heterogeneity that are not mitigated by our battery of controls. Future work should continue to explore both the potential and limits of this empirical approach.
To better understand the implications of our measure, we conducted several interviews with IP managers, attorneys, and high-level executive at …rms in a range of industries. Our discussions reinforced the interpretation that assignment is strongly associated with e¤ective delegation of authority in the R&D process. In fact, not one person interviewed found this association surprising. For example, a Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel for a global medical devices …rm opined that patent assignment to a¢ liates "re ‡ects the underlying structure of the …rm," and that it indicates with high certainty that "a¢ liates enjoy autonomy regarding IP, choice of R&D projects, and perhaps also in the overall R&D investment by the division,"
(con…dentiality prevents us from disclosing the managers and companies we interviewed).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
We also examined the patterns of assignment for prominent …rms whose R&D structure is well known. For example, Figure 1 compares the pattern of patent assignment for two prominent, diversi…ed pharmaceutical and health care companies. For each …rm we show the share of patents assigned to their top 30 a¢ liates (we aggregates as "other" all small a¢ liates beyond 30), inclusive of the headquarter. We can see that these patterns are markedly di¤erent.
Johnson and Johnson only has 9.4% of its patents assigned to headquarters (highly decentralized in our measure), which maps well to its reputation of being "the reference company for being decentralized," as characterized by its own CEO, William Weldon.
1 By contrast, Abbott
Laboratories assigned 59% of its patents to headquarters. Despite shifting to a more decentralized (and more acquisitive) strategy in the past few years, Abbott has traditionally relied on centralized R&D (Mayer, 2003) . Though there is no systematic way to perform this detailed analysis for our large sample, these and other manual checks were extremely encouraging.
More systematically, we validated our measure by comparing how closely it replicated the categorization by Argyres and Silverman's 2004 study ("AS"), which classi…ed 71 …rms as centralized, decentralized, or hybrid based on self-reported organizational structure. Considering that 12 years separate the data in our respective studies, and that AS included some …rms that are not listed on American stock exchanges, we were fortunate to have 56 of their 71 …rms in our sample. We …nd that our patent-based measure perfectly matches 38 out of 56 (68%) …rms as centralized, decentralized, or hybrid. Importantly, 15 out of the 18 mismatches involved hybrids, rather than diametrically opposite classi…cations. This is signi…cant because it suggests that our misalignment with AS could be due to a sensitivity to thresholds of classi…cation, rather than to our measure pointing in the wrong direction. Impressively, there were only three …rms where our respective classi…cations were diametrically opposed (that is, where our centralized …rms were decentralized in AS, or vice-versa). Thus we are con…dent that our measure is a reasonable empirical proxy for the decentralization of R&D.
Other variable de…nitions and measures
Internal Research focus. Our main measure of internal research is based on scienti…c publications. We use publication intensity, de…ned as the number of publications in scienti…c journal divided by sales, to measure how much the …rm invests in internal research. Scienti…c publications are a commonly accepted measure of a …rm's basic science orientation (Gambardella, 1995; Stern, 2004) , and …rms such as DuPont, IBM, Merck, and Microsoft, which have traditionally relied upon internally generated innovations, have also tended to produce a great number of scienti…c publications.
We use three supplemental measures to probe the robustness of our results to alternate measures, since the literature suggests a variety of empirical proxies. R&D intensity is measured as discounted stock of R&D, divided by lagged sales. R&D stock is calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a 15% depreciation rate (Hall, Ja¤e, and Trajtenberg, 2005) . So the R&D stock, GRD, in year t is GRD t = R t +(1 )GRD t 1 where R t is the R&D expenditure in year t and = 0:15. Typically, …rms that rely upon internal research to fuel growth have higher levels of R&D intensity. Similarly, we also expect …rms with a higher share of breakthrough product innovations to …le for more patents from a given R&D investment, when compared to …rms doing relatively more incremental and short-term research. Note that this measure may also re ‡ect a …rm's strategy for appropriating rents from R&D (Cohen et al., 2000) , as well as the incentives for patenting it provides its internal researchers. As a result, we also use patent propensity, de…ned as the number of citation weighted patents divided by R&D stock. For each patent we compute the number of citations it receives in a period of 15 years since its grant year, and normalize this count by the average number of citations received by all patents that were granted in the same year as the focal patent.
External orientation. We use multiple measures to capture external orientation. Our primary measure is share patents acquired, de…ned as the share of patents within the total stock of the …rm's patents that came to the …rm via an acquisition, as opposed to having been generated by the …rm (including its …rm's a¢ liates). This captures the degree to which a …rm relies on externally acquired technology (Capron et al., 1998; Karim, 2006 ). An ancillary measure is acquirer, a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every year when the …rm makes an acquisition (the unit of observation here is …rm-year). Our last two measures provide insight into the type of targets that the …rm acquires and happens to them post-acquisition. We classify a target as "large" if it had at least 32 (this is the top tertile in terms of patents acquired per transaction) or we classify it as "small" if it had fewer than 5 patents (lowest quartile). Dividing the number of small acquisitions by a …rm's total acquisitions gives us our share small. To explore post-merger integration, we divide a …rm's count of patent-weighted absorbed acquisitions by the total number of targets, to obtain share absorbed.
Organizational structure. As described earlier, we use share patents assigned, a continuous measure of decentralization, and a discrete classi…cation of …rms based on the measure. We classify …rms according to tertiles of share of patents assigned, and operationalize using categorical variables. These categories are: centralized (lowest tertile), hybrid (second tertile), and decentralized (third tertile). We use the centralized category as our baseline in all regressions.
Market value. Consistent with a long tradition in the economics of innovation literature (Griliches, 1982) , market value is de…ned as the sum of the values of common stock, preferred stock, and total debt net of current assets. The book value of capital includes net plant, property and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangibles other than R&D. Patents Stock is calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a 15% depreciation rate. Patents stock in year t is calculated as P atents stock t = P t + (1 )P atents stock t 1 where P t is the citations-weights ‡ow of patents in year t. In an important advance to this methodology, we can account separately for internal and external patents stock, and are thus able to disaggregate how these di¤erently contribute to …rm value.
Descriptive statistics and evidence of persistence
Average value of sales in our sample is $3.4 billion, and market value is $5.9 billion (of which $3 billion are in physical assets). As for innovation, average R&D spending is $129 million, patent stock is 174, and scienti…c publications is 58. At the …rm level, 33% of the stock of patents are assigned to a¢ liates, and 27% of patents are acquired.
Our observed measures of strategy are highly persistent over time at the …rm level. An analysis of variance (not presented in a table) indicates that between-…rm variation accounts for 87%, 81%, and 88% of the total variance for share patents acquired, share patents assigned, and publication intensity, respectively. In other words, the bulk of the variation in our measures is between …rms rather than variation over time within a …rm. This strongly supports the view that there are reinforcing interactions among the various choices, which may make it di¢ cult or undesirable for …rms to abruptly change any of their core strategies. We do not suggest that …rms are static. It may be that as …rms mature, some may become more "exploitative"
rather than "explorative"as they focus on commercialization. Alternatively, more mature …rms may be the only ones that can support large internal research, which would imply the opposite.
However, as discussed earlier, it took nearly a century for DuPont to go from decentralized to centralized and back. Thus, it may be that this sort of evolution occurs at a pace that is too gradual for our data to capture.
We perform an additional test to measure the stability of our focal strategies over time by comparing a …rm's ordinal ranking for each measure at the end of the sample to the ranking on the …rst year it appears in the sample. Thus, we see whether a …rm assigned to a particular quartile in its …rst year is assigned to a di¤erent quartile in the last year. This way of assessing persistence obviates the need to control for changes in the environment or changes in …rm size or other such variables.
We observe very little variation in publication intensity within …rms over time. Over 91 percent of …rms are in the same quartile of publication intensity at the end of the period as they were at the start of the period. Only about 6 percent of …rms move up in the distribution at all, and less than 3 percent move up by at two quartiles or more. About 4 percent of all …rms move down the distribution, but none drops by more than a single quartile.
We observe slightly more time variation in share patents acquired, with 82 percent of …rms not changing their acquisition category, 12 percent of the …rms becoming relatively more acquisitionintensive over time, and 6 percent of all …rms dropping down at least one quartile. Finally, there is more time variation in share patents assigned, where 59 percent of the …rms in our sample do not change their assignment category throughout the sample period. Here, 25 percent of …rms move up in decentralization distribution, and the remaining 16 percent of …rms move down (i.e., become more centralized relative to the population). Of all the …rms that change quartile (up or down), nearly three quarters move by only one quartile in rank over the entire sample period.
In sum, we …nd that the bulk of the variation is across …rms, despite the fact that our sample period witnessed many changes in the environment, including the energy crises of the 1970s, the merger waves of the 1980s, the rise of the high-tech sector, and globalization.
This persistence makes it meaningful to speak of coherence across choices that …rms make along the focal dimensions of innovation strategy namely internal research, external knowledge, and organizational structure.
[Insert Table 1 here] 3.4 Relationships among structure, external orientation, and internal research
Non-parametric analysis
We begin by exploring the relationships between organization, acquisitions, and internal research in Table 2 . Speci…cally, we look at how both share patents acquired and publication intensity vary across …rms with varying levels of decentralization. Consistent with our coherence arguments, we …nd discrete patterns of heterogeneity among …rms, where centralization is associated both with lower reliance on acquired patents and with greater publication intensity. Table 2 shows three important relationships. First, there is signi…cant variation in size across decentralization categories (columns 1 and 2). Decentralized …rms have the lowest patent stock.
Hybrid …rms are the largest both in terms of sales and number of patents. Centralized …rms are smaller than decentralized …rms in terms of sales, but they have close to double the number of patents. This variation in size and patenting highlights the importance of controlling for …rm size in our parametric explorations. As well, it suggests that even though hybrids are classi…ed based on our decentralization measure, they need not be similarly positioned in other dimensions. In fact, as we shall show, hybrids are not always along the continuum between centralized and decentralized. Future work should further explore the unique attributes of this group.
Second, in column 3 we see that average share of acquired patents increases steeply as we move from centralized …rms (11% of patents acquired) to decentralized …rms (87% of patents acquired). In unreported analyses, we …nd that the same pattern of results holds when we examine the percentage of …rms that are classi…ed in the top tertile of share patents acquired:
only 11% of centralized …rms are in the top tertile of share patents acquired, compared to 57% of decentralized …rms.
An important goal for this study is to better understand the relationship between structure and external orientation. We further explore this in Columns 4-8, which show a strong positive relationship between the two. We distinguish between two types of acquired units. Dissolved units are those that cease to operate independently and consequently transfer their patents to the parent. Conversely, kept units not only retain the patents that they had prior to acquisition but also continue to be assigned new patents generated post-acquisition. As shown in Columns 4 and 5, a …rm's acquisition volume is highly correlated with the relationship between decentralization and external orientation. However, it is important to note that this relationship is also driven by how the …rm deals with acquisitions, not simply by how acquisitive the …rm is. This is because …rms vary in the degree to which they let acquisitions remain independent (which is the channel through which acquisitions lead to decentralization), as well as in the size of the target …rms that they acquire. Column 4 shows that centralized …rms make substantially fewer acquisitions than hybrid or decentralized …rms (3.5 versus 10.8 and 12.6 total acquisitions over the study period, respectively). Normalizing number of acquisitions by sales (column 5), suggests that the negative association between centralization and acquisitions is nearly linear. While centralized …rms make 1.9 acquisitions per billion of dollar in sales, hybrids make 3, and decentralized …rms make 5.3 acquisitions. More importantly, there is a clear distinction in post-acquisition absorption strategy (column 6). Centralized …rms absorb 64% of their targets, compared to 42% for hybrids and only 21% for decentralized …rms.
Columns 7 and 8 present evidence on average size of the acquired pool of patents. Centralized …rms acquired substantially smaller portfolios, averaging 26 patents per deal, while there is little di¤erence between hybrid and decentralized …rms, which both average 50 patents per acquisition.
As shown in column 8, there appears to be systematic variation in acquisition size. We classify acquired a¢ liates as small if the number of patents they hold at the year of acquisition is in the lowest 25 percent of the distribution of number of patents by acquired …rms. 61 percent of the targets by centralized …rms are classi…ed a small, as compared to 43 percent by hybrid, and 37 percent by decentralized …rms. This …nding is signi…cant because it points to one reason for the di¤erences in absorption rates. Smaller acquisitions, possibly representing young technologybased …rms, should be easier to absorb into an existing division, whereas large acquisitions are both harder to integrate and also more capable of operating as a standalone subsidiary. Later in the analysis, we show that even after controlling for characteristics of the acquiring …rm, small acquisitions are more likely to be absorbed (Column 5 in Table 3 ). In sum, we …nd that the relationship between acquisition and decentralization is driven not only by how acquisitive the …rm is, but also by the relative size of the acquisition (in terms of patents) and the extent to which acquired targets are kept independent or integrated into the parent.
These …ndings are important because structural integration is one of the levers that managers use to shape both the nature of research and the structure of the …rm (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006) . Thus, regardless of a …rm's rate of acquisition, the decision to absorb or not absorb may ultimately have the bigger e¤ect on how decentralized it is (for example Microsoft acquires a lot, yet remains centralized). However, the decision to absorb may be related to the nature of research that a …rm performs, if basic research involves resource recombination, which in turn may require the absorption of the acquired entity (Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell, 1998) . Alternatively, the decision to absorb may re ‡ect a mix of coherence and inertia (i.e. centralized …rms have so many complementary systems and structures that integration is less costly, while it may also have a managerial philosophy which favors absorption).
Third, we …nd a striking negative relationship between structure and internal research.
Centralized …rms publish much more per dollar of sales revenue than decentralized …rms, and they have substantially higher R&D intensity. As shown in column 10, centralized …rms have the highest ratio of publications to sales (21.4), decentralized have the lowest ratio (6.6), and hybrid …rms lie in the middle (10.5). A similar picture emerges if we use R&D intensity instead of publication intensity. Column 12 shows that centralized …rms have an R&D to sales ratio of 0.43, as compared to a ratio of 0.29 for hybrid …rms, and 0.21 for decentralized …rms.
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 here]
The patterns of results reported in table 2 capture the coherence logic. We show this more starkly in …gure 2, which plots how the values for external orientation (Column 3, Table 2) and research orientation (Column 10, Table 2 ) move in opposite directions. External orientation increases with the degree of decentralization whereas research orientation decreases with decentralization.
Because the simple relationships in Tables 2 and 3 may re ‡ect industry e¤ects, as well as di¤erences in …rm characteristics, we next perform a parametric analysis that controls for these factors.
Parametric analysis
Our …ndings thus far serve as large-scale validation and extension of earlier studies. However they are not conditioned on important variables that may drive the observed relationships between our focal variables. To mitigate such concerns, we move to parametric analysis. We emphasize that the patterns of association we report should not be interpreted in a causal sense-we do not argue that a choice made in one dimension should determine a choice in another dimension. Instead, we show the conditional correlations between our measures, while gradually removing sources of co-variation such as …rm size and industry e¤ects. Table 3 presents the conditional relationship between the acquisition of external knowledge, internal research, and decentralization. We cluster standard errors by …rm, and include 248 fourdigit SIC dummies as industry …xed e¤ects. Columns 1-7 present the conditional correlation of decentralization with external orientation, and Columns 8-13 present the conditional correlation of decentralization with internal research.
Column 1 shows a very large coe¢ cient estimate on the dummy for decentralization (0.75), and a much lower estimate on the coe¢ cient on the dummy for hybrid (0.17). In column 2 we also control for publications intensity (the lagged ratio between publications stock and sales) as a measure of internal research. The coe¢ cient estimates on structure are not a¤ected by controlling for publications intensity. The coe¢ cient estimate on publications intensity is negative and signi…cant, indicating that, conditional on structure, higher internal research is associated with less acquisition activity. In unreported speci…cations we explore the extent to which structure conditions the publications-acquisitions relationship. Estimating the speci…cation from Column 2 without the structure dummies yields a large and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient for publication intensity of -0.1, whereas controlling for structure causes the coe¢ cient to drop in half.
In other words, structure strongly conditions the negative relationship between publication activity and …rms' acquisition of external knowledge. We …nd similar patterns with alternative measures of research orientation, such as the lagged log of the ratio of R&D stock to sales. Not controlling for structure, there is a strong negative relationship between R&D intensity and external orientation: the coe¢ cient estimate on R&D intensity is -0.12 and is highly signi…cant (a standard error of 0.04). Controlling for structure, however, this estimate drops to -0.03 and is no longer signi…cant.
In additional unreported speci…cations, the results remain unchanged when we restrict the sample to …rms that make at least one acquisition, indicating that our estimates are not likely to stem from comparing acquiring to non-acquiring …rms.
These results suggest that …rms with high internal research investments acquire less external knowledge, not just because of their internal R&D focus, but also because such …rms also have a more centralized structure, which itself is also correlated with fewer acquisitions. In other words, this …nding suggests that analyzing the relationship between internal and external knowledge, without accounting for the organizational structure of the …rm, may be misleading.
Columns 3 to 5 show that both centralized …rms and research-intensive …rms, as well as …rms that tend to make smaller acquisitions, are more likely to absorb their acquisitions. In unreported speci…cations we …nd that the estimated coe¢ cients of publication intensity and share patents assigned are largely independent of whether the other measure is included or not.
This suggests that both centralization and a focus on internal research are associated with a greater likelihood that the target is absorbed. This supports the notion that centralized …rms would acquire more nascent external technology to integrate into their existing research (Capron et al., 1998; Karim, 2006) , whereas decentralized …rms may acquire more developed technology that is closer to being commercialized (e.g., Cisco's "acquire and develop" model).
We next examine the relationship between the share of small acquisitions and structure (columns 6 and 7). We …nd that centralized …rms are more likely to engage in smaller acquisitions. Surprisingly, we …nd no systematic relationship between internal research and the share of small acquisitions (column 7). In unreported results where we do not control for structure, the coe¢ cient estimate on publications intensity is once again small and insigni…cant. In other words, whether conditional on structure or by itself, publications intensity is not correlated with the share of small acquisitions. This is a surprising result, particularly since smaller acquisitions are more likely to be absorbed (Column 5), and internal research is associated with greater likelihood of absorption of targets (Column 4). We …nd the same pattern when we measure internal research using R&D intensity instead of publications intensity. Whether this re ‡ects a limitation of our measures or a deeper puzzle is a topic for future research.
In sum, Columns 1 to 7 support our conjecture that, at least in part, internal research is related to external knowledge acquisition because internal research is also related to organizational structure, which in turn is related to external knowledge. Columns 8 to 13 investigate the same issue but shifts the analysis to concentrate on the nature of internal research and its relationship to both structure and external acquisitions. We supplement our main measure of internal research investment with R&D stock and patent propensity. We use logs of both publication and R&D stock. By using log of sales as a control, we allow for a more ‡exible relationship than if we simply used the ratio of publication to sales or R&D to sales as a dependent variable.
In columns 8 and 9 we regress publications stock as the dependent variable. We …nd a strong negative relationship between decentralization and scienti…c publications: decentralized …rms publish 48 percent less than centralized …rms. There is no di¤erence, however, between hybrid …rms and centralized …rms (Column 8). We also …nd a negative relation between publications and share patents acquired (column 9), however, it is not statistically signi…cant when controlling for structure. When not controlling for structure (not reported), the coe¢ cient estimate on share patents acquired is very large in absolute value and is highly signi…cant (-0.31 with a standard error of 0.12). Organization structure thus is signi…cantly associated with investment in internal research, even after conditioning on external knowledge sourcing. This …nding, that the relation between internal research and external orientation is strongly mediated by structure, warrants further study.
Columns 10 to 13 show that similar patterns obtain when we repeat these tests using our alternative measures of internal research focus. The pattern of our …ndings is strongly consistent across all speci…cations. One notable exception is Column 13, where we …nd a strong negative relationship between external orientation and patent propensity, even when controlling for structure. In unreported speci…cations, we …nd weaker results for citations per patent, where hybrid …rms show the highest citations per patent.
Overall, Table 3 shows that the simple patterns reported in Tables 2 are not just due to di¤erences in industry, …rm size, or time. As we expected, the choices of …rms along the three focal elements of innovation strategy are not randomly distributed, so the choice along one dimension is systematically predictive of choices in the other two dimensions. Moreover, our results also point to the intriguing (and understudied) role that organizational structure may play in the overall innovation strategy. Whereas innovation scholars have focused on the relationship between internal research and external knowledge, Table 3 suggests that internal structure signi…cantly conditions the relationship between internal research and acquisition of external knowledge.
One must be cautious in interpreting these patterns because they may re ‡ect di¤erences in the precision with which we measure various concepts. Yet, this calls for further research, both theoretical and empirical, into the ways in which the internal organization of the …rm interacts with investments in internal and external knowledge. We still know very little about the origins of structure-whether it arises alongside strategy, for example, or is driven by strategy-and this focuses attention on why this neglected pillar of organizational research (Gavetti, Levinthal, and Ocasio, 2007 ) needs more attention.
[Insert Table 3 ] 
Firm Market Value
We have shown that centralization is associated with investment in basic research while decentralization is associated with a strong emphasis on accessing external innovations. We have also argued that these patterns may re ‡ect the underlying innovation strategy of the …rm. If this so, the innovation strategy of a …rm should have direct implications for how the …rm creates value: Centralized …rms' internally generated knowledge should be a key source of value creation, whereas external knowledge should drive market value for decentralized …rms. In other words, we would expect that unmeasured "intangible assets"should account for a greater share of value for centralized …rms relative to decentralized …rms, since internal investments in research are more di¢ cult to measure than acquisitions of external knowledge. Indeed, we …nd that the average "market to book"ratio (commonly known as Tobin's Q) is 1.5 for centralized …rms, but only 1.3 for decentralized …rms.
A more consequential implication of this is that not only should centralized …rms have more intangible assets, the intangible portion of their assets should also be more heavily related to internal knowledge. Conversely, the intangible assets of decentralized …rms should be related more closely to acquisitions of external knowledge. We are able to empirically examine this by estimating a version of the value function approach proposed by Griliches (1981) . We stress variation across …rms rather than within-…rm variation, because as we have already shown, the vast bulk of the variation in internal structure is across …rms, rather than within …rms. Table 4 presents the estimation results. We begin by estimating a standard value function, using two measures of knowledge stock-R&D stock and patent stock. To control for patent quality we weight each patent by the ratio between the number of citations it receives and one plus the average number of citations received by all patents that were granted in the same year (one is added to both numerator and denominator to avoid zero weights). In the baseline speci…cations we control for the log of lagged assets, industry …xed e¤ects (using 197 four-digit SIC dummies), and year e¤ects. Later in the analysis we also control for sales and sales growth, as well as split the sample by technical diversi…cation and size.
Columns 1 and 2 show that R&D stock and patent stock are both positively associated with value. We also see that their e¤ects are largely independent, as the coe¢ cient of R&D stock falls only slightly when patent stock is added. Column 3 distinguishes between patents that are generated internally and "external" patents that are acquired via M&A transactions.
Both internal and external patents seem positively associated with market value, and have very similar coe¢ cients. However, as we shall show, these average results mask stark di¤erences across …rms with di¤erent organizational structures.
Columns 4 to 6 split the sample into tertiles of decentralization using the same classi…cation from Tables 2 and 3 . The …rst striking …nding in column 4 is that for centralized …rms R&D stock has a very large and highly signi…cant positive correlation with market value (a coe¢ cient estimate of 0.16), but whereas internal patents continue to be associated with value, external patents cease to matter. On the other hand, we see the opposite pattern for decentralized …rms (column 6). Here we …nd a large positive correlation between external patents and value for decentralized …rms (coe¢ cient estimate of 0.08), and an R&D coe¢ cient estimate which is less
than half of what we observe for centralized …rms. This pattern is consistent with the idea that there are di¤erent routes to value creation, which require di¤erent supporting organizational structures. Firms relying on internal research to create value should …nd centralization more compatible with their objective. Conversely, a decentralized …rm should be more likely to derive value from acquired patents.
Columns 7 to 9 add sales and sales growth as controls. The patterns regarding R&D stock remains robust. But there is an interesting change in the estimate on external patents for decentralized …rms. Controlling for sales and sales growth, this coe¢ cient drops to 0.05 (not statistically signi…cant) from an estimate of 0.08 without these controls. In fact, this drop is mostly attributed to controlling for sales growth: when excluding sales growth but still controlling for sales, the coe¢ cient estimate on external patents stock is 0.07 and is statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level. This intriguing result points to a fruitful avenue for future research to investigate whether decentralized …rms are more reliant upon growth to create value, and do so by commercializing and scaling up external innovations, whereas centralized …rms use internally generated innovations.
If what we are capturing is related to the importance of alignment between organizational structure and the knowledge-sourcing strategy, we should expect our results to be stronger for larger …rms and for …rms that operate in a diverse range of businesses and technologies, relative to smaller …rms and …rms that are narrowly focused. This is because for small and undiversi…ed …rms, the formal organizational structure will be more malleable (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) .
To probe this conjecture we divide …rms by their degree of technical diversity. We measure technical diversity by the number of technology areas in which the …rm patents. We classify …rms as having low or high technological diversity according to the sample median value of the number of three-digit technology classes the …rm patents in.
Finally, we note that for centralized …rms, the amount of assets held account for a much smaller share of the value than in decentralized …rms, consistent with the simple di¤erences in Tobin's Q discussed earlier. Even more intriguingly, sales growth is considerably more strongly associated with market value in decentralized …rms than in centralized …rms. However, interpreting market-value regression coe¢ cients is not straightforward (see for instance, Czarnitzki et al., 2006), and we must leave it to more future research with more …ne-grained measures to pursue these tantalizing lines of inquiry.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Despite the coarseness of the measurement, Table 5 shows that the contrast between R&D stock and external patents appears to be substantially driven by diversi…ed …rms and by large …rms. We acknowledge that this measure is imperfect, because it measures technical diversity rather than product market diversity, and because it is likely highly correlated with the scale of the …rm's patenting activities. Future work should explore how these results hold up with more granular business-level data.
Columns 1-6 show the results for diversi…ed and specialized …rms. Among the set of technically diversi…ed …rms, centralized …rms derive considerable value from internal R&D, whereas decentralized …rms derive little value from internal R&D (coe¢ cient estimates of 0.16 versus -0.01). Centralized …rms derive less value from external patents than do decentralized …rms, although the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients is not statistically signi…cant (0.03 compared to 0.05).
By contrast, the …t between internal structure and knowledge sourcing in creating value seems to matter less for specialized …rms. All …rms derive value from internal R&D, although the reliance is more marked among centralized rather than decentralized …rms, and external patents appear to be uncorrelated with value.
Diversi…ed …rms tend to be large as well. To explore this aspect, we divided …rms by size, classifying …rms as large if their sales were above the median level of sales. Columns 7 to 12
show that patterns observed in Table 4 are also more marked for large …rms, implying that we cannot con…dently distinguish whether the greater salience of structure in such …rms re ‡ects the e¤ects of diversity or size. In large …rms, R&D stock is associated with value for centralized …rms but not decentralized …rms (coe¢ cient estimate of 0.09 compared to 0.01). Conversely, external patents are associated with value in decentralized …rms but not in centralized …rms (coe¢ cient estimate of 0.10 compared to 0.03).
Overall, our …ndings support the interpretation that …rms that rely upon internal research to create value are best served by a centralized organization, in contrast to …rms that rely upon external knowledge, especially in large or technically diversi…ed …rms. More importantly, …rms seem to be able to derive proportionally more or less value from internal or external knowledge depending on their overall set of characteristics, even when they utilize both internal and external as inputs.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Robustness
In a number of unreported tests, we probed the robustness of the relationships documented in Table 3 . We summarize these tests brie ‡y.
Size: We checked the sensitivity of our results to …rm size by excluding very small and very large …rms from the sample (lowest and highest sales deciles). This ensures that the conditional correlations presented above are not driven by comparing very small to very large …rms. We …nd similar results to those reported here, reassuring us that cross-…rm size variation does not drive the main relationships in our data.
Geography: Though there is a growing literature on the geographical location and management of R&D activities (Leiponen and Helfat, 2011; Singh, 2008) , the question of geography is logically distinct from the question of internal organization. For example, as Singh (2008) puts it, a …rm could have a decentralized formal organization even with relatively small number of R&D locations, while another …rm might have a much more centralized organization despite having a much greater number of R&D locations. Though the location of activities obviously has implications for how they should be managed, other considerations such as access to users, talented researchers, or knowledge spillovers are also important geography considerations (Kogut, 1991; Ja¤e, 1986) . Nonetheless, in order to mitigate against contamination from impacts of geography on our sample we add a vector of 197 location dummies which control for the share of patents that each …rm generates within a given Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA). The results in Tables 4 and 5 are largely unchanged.
A¢ liates:
We also con…rm that our results continue to hold when we exclude from our sample 212 …rms with no a¢ liates. By construction, their share of assigned patents is zero (thus these …rms are classi…ed as centralized). To test whether our set of relationships is driven by the distinction between …rms with and without a¢ liates, we estimate the main speci…cations for a sample that includes only …rms with at least one a¢ liate, regardless of whether the a¢ liate patents or not. Demonstrating that our results continue to hold also within a sample of …rms that have at least one a¢ liate eliminates the concern that the results are driven by comparing …rms with and without a¢ liates.
Patenting scale: Another potential concern relates to …rms that have relatively few patents.
Our measure of decentralization is based on the ratio between assigned patents and total patents held by the …rm. This ratio is likely to be less informative for …rms with a small number of patents. We estimate the main speci…cations for a sample that excludes …rms with fewer than 15 patents in total, and …nd results similar to those reported here.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we exploit rich new data on over a thousand American …rms to explore the interplay among three important dimensions of innovation strategy: R&D organizational structure, external knowledge sourcing, and internal research focus. A new measure of decentralization allows us to perform the …rst such large-scale study, documenting patterns supporting the view that …rms make consistent and coherent choices along these three dimensions. This yields some important contributions. First, we validate prior …ndings in the literature that have shown a link between structure and the nature of innovation (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Lerner and Wulf, 2007) , with an empirical approach that mitigates small sample problems and improves replicability. Second, we document a pattern that strongly suggests a positive link between decentralization and external orientation. To our knowledge, this relationship has not received any attention in the literature. These are valuable contributions, especially given the growing awareness within the strategy …eld of the need for more studies that document "just the facts" (Oxley et al., 2010; Hambrick, 2007; Bettis, 2012) .
Third, we go beyond mere descriptions, as our analysis clari…es and extends prior results that relied on simpler one-to-one relationships. We …nd that structure strongly conditions the negative relationship that has been shown between internal research and the acquisition of external knowledge. Documenting this contingency is interesting and important beyond our setting. Though recent work has highlighted the importance of structure as a "forgotten pillar" of organizational theory (Gavetti, et al., 2007; Joseph and Ocasio, 2012) , organizational structure remains stubbornly di¢ cult to observe, and its role in shaping information processing and incentives continues to puzzle managers and researchers (Wulf, 2012) . Consistent with the implications of Karim and Mitchell's (2004) …ndings, we also …nd that internal and external outputs provide di¤erent contributions to di¤erent …rms. Whereas centralized …rms derive more value from internal R&D, decentralized …rms do so from externally acquired patents.
It is likely that …rms that innovate primarily by developing knowledge internally favor investments in more basic, long-term research and do not rely much on incremental research that merely improves existing goods and services. Typically, such basic research is best centralized because individual business units are unlikely to support it adequately. Our …ndings suggest that these …rms rely less on external knowledge, and may use it principally to complement their internal knowledge. By contrast, other …rms may be unwilling or unable to make the same large investments in internal research to fuel innovation and growth. Their internal R&D is likely to be focused on improving existing products and processes, which is best managed by the business units that produce those products and services. Our …ndings suggest that such …rms are more likely to look outside for new technologies. Given limited internal capability for evaluating and assimilating nascent technologies, they may favor the acquisition of proven technologies, embodied within target …rms that can operate independently and contribute to the commercialization e¤orts.
Neither strategy is intrinsically better, and in fact most …rms do a mix of both. Firms choose more of one or the other based on their particular context, which may be shaped by their initial founding conditions and capabilities, their environment, and how their capabilities and environments evolve (Nadler and Tushman, 1997) . What may matter more is how a particular combination of strategies maps to the …rm's capabilities. The upshot is that di¤erent types of knowledge strategies can create value, if matched to the right context and aligned with the appropriate organizational structure.
Though our empirical strategy generates new insights from the concurrent examination of these various strategic choices and outcomes, it is not meant to establish the direction of causality. Future work should further exploit our novel measure of decentralization, as well as time and exogenous variation in order to better explain the systematic patterns we have described.
But just as importantly, our empirical …ndings should inform future theory development, in the quest to understand the link between innovation strategy and structure. In particular, we highlight the importance of organizational structure as an integral part of corporate strategy.
From a normative perspective, our paper should alert managers to the perils of prescriptions which do not account for the three main facets of R&D strategy. For example, given the role of structure in conditioning the relationship between internal development and external knowledge integration, it is unlikely that innovation strategy can be charted using a simple "make vs. buy" logic, if this does not take into account the complex role played by organizational structure.
Conversely, knowledge-intensive …rms contemplating radical change in terms of increasing or decreasing their centralization should take into account the way in which structure will shape other dimensions of innovation strategy.
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